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This paper develops a Mirrlees (1971) framework with heterogeneous agents to analyze op-
timal redistributive taxes, optimal provision of public goods and the marginal cost of public
funds (MCF). Standard MCF measures are shown to suﬀer from three defects: i) The MCF
for the (non-individualized) lump-sum tax is generally not equal to one. ii) The MCF for
distortionary taxes is not directly related to the marginal excess burden. iii) MCF measures
for both lump-sum and distortionary taxes are highly sensitive to the choice of the untaxed
numéraire good. These problems are caused by using the private rather than the social
marginal value of private income to calculate the MCF, and disappear by using the social
marginal value of private income. Moreover, by allowing for redistributional concerns, the
marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes equals the marginal distributional gain at the
optimal tax system. MCF therefore equals one, both for lump-sum and distortionary taxes,
and the modiﬁed Samuelson rule should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public
funds.
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1Pigou (1947): “Where there is indirect damage, it ought to be added to the direct
loss of satisfaction involved in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by
taxation, before this is balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the marginal ex-
penditure. It follows that, in general, expenditure ought not to be carried out so far
as to make the real yield of the marginal unit of resources expended by the govern-
ment equal to the real yields of the last unit left in the hands of the representative
citizen (p. 34).”
Browning (1976): “If the ﬁnancing of expenditure programs involves a welfare
cost, then this cost should be considered part of the opportunity cost of the expendi-
ture programs. ... Thus, an expenditure program will be eﬃcient only if its beneﬁts
exceed the direct tax cost by an amount that is at least as large as the additional
welfare cost of the funds (p. 283).”
Ballard and Fullerton (1992): “Samuelson’s formula assumes that all of the rev-
enue needed to ﬁnance public goods can be raised with lump-sum taxes. Since this
is not generally possible, the formula needs to be modiﬁed to account for the distor-
tionary eﬀects of the tax system. An appropriate modiﬁcation is to multiply the cost
side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public
funds (MCF) (p. 117).”
1 Introduction
The marginal cost of public funds is the ratio of the marginal value of a unit of resources raised
by the government and the marginal value of that unit of resources for the private sector. The
marginal cost of public funds is therefore a measure indicating the scarcity of public resources.
Ever since Pigou (1947), many scholars and policymakers are convinced that the marginal cost
of funds must be larger than one, since the government relies on distortionary taxes to ﬁnance its
outlays. Due to the deadweight losses associated with higher taxes, the private sector needs to
sacriﬁce more welfare (expressed in monetary terms) than the one unit of funds raised through
distortionary taxes. The quotes above illustrate well the notion that the marginal cost of funds
is larger than one.
If the marginal cost of public funds is indeed larger than one, this has important normative
consequences for the determination of optimal public policy in many ﬁelds. In early theoretical
contributions, Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974) demonstrated that
the Samuelson (1954) rule for the optimum provision of public goods needs to be modiﬁed
to account for tax distortions.1 The optimal level of public-goods provision should be lower
if the marginal cost of public funds is higher. Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) demonstrated that the optimal corrective tax is generally set below the Pigouvian tax
that perfectly internalizes all externalities, since a high marginal cost of public funds makes the
internalization of externalities more expensive. Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) put the marginal cost
1Ballard and Fullerton (1992) provide an extensive review of the large literature that subsequently emerged.
2of public funds at the center of their theories on optimal procurement and regulation. A larger
cost of public funds renders rent extraction more valuable compared to provision of cost-reducing
incentives. In the analysis of optimal debt management provided by Barro (1979) and Lucas
and Stokey (1983), tax-smoothing ensures that the distortionary cost of taxation is equalized
over time. Consequently, debt policy essentially ensures that the marginal cost of public funds
is smoothed over time. Some applied policy analysts increase the cost of public projects in
social cost-beneﬁt analyses by pre-multiplying the costs of the project with a marginal cost of
public funds exceeding one. See, for a recent example, Heckman et al. (2010), who add 50
cents per dollar spent on public programs to correct for the deadweight costs of taxation. Many
other examples can be given, but the message is clear: the marginal cost of public funds has a
tremendous impact on how governments should evaluate the desirability of public policies.
This paper demonstrates that the scientiﬁc debate on the marginal cost of public funds has
gone astray in various directions. It reveals that standard marginal cost of public funds measures
– commonly derived in linear tax models – suﬀer from three important defects. Firstly, the
marginal cost of funds for lump-sum taxes is not equal to one, whereas there is no theoretical
presumption that it should diﬀer from one, given that lump-sum taxes are non-distortionary.
Secondly, the marginal cost of public funds for distortionary taxes is generally unrelated to the
marginal excess burden of taxation, although this relationship is often suggested (see Pigou, 1947;
Harberger, 1964; Browning, 1976). Indeed, one would expect a direct correspondence between
the marginal cost of public funds and the deadweight loss of taxation. Thirdly, standard measures
for the marginal cost of public funds for both lump-sum and distortionary taxes are disturbingly
sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good in the economy. The marginal cost of public funds
measures for all tax instruments do not remain the same if the choice of the untaxed numéraire
good changes – even though the allocations remain identical under each normalization. These
problems are suggestive of a problematic concept of the marginal cost of public funds, which
renders the marginal cost of funds measures useless in economic theory and in applied policy
analysis.
The analysis of this paper shows that these defects are caused by adopting an economi-
cally unappealing measure for the social marginal value of private income when computing the
marginal cost of public funds. In particular, to obtain an economically meaningful measure for
the marginal cost of funds, the social marginal value of a unit of public income should be divided
by (the average of) the social marginal value of a unit of private income. Instead, the private
marginal value of private income is commonly used as a measure for the social marginal value of
private income.2 However, this measure does not correctly measure the social marginal value of
private income, since it ignores policy-induced income eﬀects on taxed bases. If the government
loses or gains tax revenues due to income eﬀects on taxed bases, these revenue gains or losses
create a divergence between social marginal value of private income and the private marginal
value of private income.
This paper follows Diamond (1975) to deﬁne the social marginal value of private income
by the private marginal value of private income plus the income eﬀects on taxed bases due to
2It could be multiplied by a welfare weight in order to capture a social preference for redistribution.
3transferring resources between the public and private sector. If the marginal cost of public funds
is deﬁned as the ratio between the social marginal value of public income and the social marginal
value of private income, this yields a marginal cost of funds measure that is equal to unity for
lump-sum taxation. Moreover, a direct correspondence is obtained between the marginal cost
of public funds and the marginal excess burden of taxation – as long as distributional concerns
are absent. In particular, it is shown that the marginal cost of funds of a distortionary tax then
equals the inverse of one minus the excess burden of the tax. Finally, the marginal cost of public
funds measures have become insensitive to the normalization of the tax code.
Resolving these theoretical issues is a prerequisite to developing the main contribution of the
paper. In particular, the conventional wisdom is challenged that the marginal cost of public funds
should be larger than one, due to the distortions caused by taxation. Most of the literature, on
which the analysis of the marginal cost of funds has been based, has focused on Ramsey (1927)
frameworks with homogeneous agents. Non-individualized lump-sum taxes are ruled out so as
to obtain a non-trivial second-best analysis (see, e.g., Browning, 1976, 1987; Wildasin, 1984;
Ballard and Fullerton, 1992).3 However, in this context Sandmo (1998) and Werning (2007)
note the following:
Sandmo (1998): “The observation that many discussions of the marginal cost of
public funds are based on theoretical models where distributional issues have been
assumed away is somewhat paradoxical, since the distortionary eﬀects of taxation,
on which thinking around the MCF is based, can only be justiﬁed from a welfare
economics point of view by their positive eﬀects on the distribution of income” (pp.
378–379).
Werning (2007): “Societies may have good reasons for avoiding complete reliance
on lump-sum taxes, but none of these are captured by a representative-agent Ramsey
framework. Although the ﬁrst-best allocation is ruled out, an arbitrary second-best
problem is set in its place. What conﬁdence can we have that tax recommendations
obtained this way accurately evaluate the trade-oﬀs faced by society? If, for unspec-
iﬁed reasons, lump-sum taxes are presumed undesirable, yet still highly desirable
within the model, how can we be sure that tax prescriptions derived are not, for the
same unspeciﬁed reasons, also socially undesirable? (pp. 925–926).”
The literature on optimal income taxation – pioneered by Mirrlees (1971) – provides a solid
microeconomic foundation for analyzing tax distortions. Households are heterogeneous with
respect to their earning ability (or skill levels). The government aims to maximize a stan-
dard Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function, implying a preference for a more equal welfare
distribution between households. This can be due to either diminishing marginal utility of in-
come at the household level or a concave transformation of household welfare levels. However,
3Some authors have allowed for heterogeneous agents; see, for example, the contributions by Browning and
Johnson (1984) and Allgood and Snow (1998), but these studies focus mainly on the eﬃciency costs of taxation.
Others have explicitly introduced distributional aspects of public goods and taxes (see, e.g., Christiansen, 1981;
Wilson, 1991; Boadway and Keen, 1993; Kaplow, 1996; Sandmo, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001; Dahlby,
2008).
4the government cannot achieve any desired distribution of welfare due to informational con-
straints. Since earning abilities are private information, an individualized lump-sum tax is not
incentive-compatible. Therefore, the government needs to rely on a tax on observable income (or
consumption), which results in labor supply distortions. Distributional concerns in combination
with informational constraints thus provide the fundamental reason why distortionary taxation
is optimal in the second-best.
Ramsey (1927) frameworks with representative agents produce misleading results on the
marginal cost of public funds by not allowing for distributional concerns to motivate tax dis-
tortions. In the Mirrlees (1971) framework, the informational constraint that ability is private
information does not exclude the possibility that the government levies non-individualized lump-
sum taxes, as these taxes are always incentive-compatible. Hence, non-individualized lump-sum
taxes need not be ruled out in an ad hoc fashion so as to obtain a non-trivial second-best pol-
icy problem. This paper demonstrates that, at the optimal tax system, the marginal cost of
public funds is equalized across all tax instruments. Since the government always has a non-
individualized lump-sum tax at its disposal, the marginal cost of public funds for all distortionary
taxes should then be equal to the unit marginal cost of public funds of the non-individualized
lump-sum tax. The excess burden of income taxes should thus be exactly compensated by the
social marginal beneﬁts of redistribution; the tax system would otherwise not have been opti-
mized. Therefore, at the optimal tax system the marginal cost of public funds is equal to one
for distortionary taxes as well.
This paper employs a Mirrlees (1971) framework that is extended with public-goods provision
to demonstrate that redistribution of income and the provision of public goods should be seen
as separate government tasks. The marginal excess burden of distortionary taxation is the
price of equality, not the price of the government – excluding its redistributional tasks. If
the government was not interested in redistribution, then all distortionary tax rates would be
zero and all public goods would be ﬁnanced with non-distortionary non-individualized lump-
sum taxes. This ﬁnding reveals that redistribution and public-goods provision are not properly
disentangled in the Ramsey (1927) approach with a representative agent, where both tasks are
(implicitly) lumped together in the government-revenue requirement.
The ﬁnding that the marginal cost of public funds equals one has signiﬁcant normative
consequences for the way in which governments should evaluate public policy. Indeed, it is shown
to be erroneous to correct the modiﬁed Samuelson rule for public-goods provision for the marginal
cost of public funds as long as the tax system is optimally set. Consequently, no corrections
for deadweight losses of taxation need to be made in social cost-beneﬁt analysis. Extending
the line of reasoning of the current paper, Jacobs and de Mooij (2010) demonstrate that it is
not desirable to pursue less aggressive environmental policies in the presence of distortionary
taxation. Werning (2007) ﬁnds that the optimal path of public debt becomes indeterminate and
Ricardian equivalence is restored in the presence of distortionary redistributive taxation.
This paper’s ﬁndings are related to Kaplow (1996), Kaplow (2004), Laroque (2005) and
Gauthier and Laroque (2009). These authors explore the conditions under which tax distortions
arising from the income tax need not play a role in second-best policy rules under sub-optimal
5income taxation. In particular, if the government designs beneﬁt-absorbing changes in the non-
linear income tax schedule, it can fully oﬀset the distributional impact of larger public good
provision. Moreover, the public good cum tax change does not change labor supply incentives,
as long as preferences are identical across households and weakly separable between labor supply
and other commodities. Consequently, the beneﬁt-absorbing tax change perfectly imitates a pure
beneﬁt tax, and standard ﬁrst-best policy rules can be applied in the second-best.4 In contrast,
this paper shows that distortions from labor taxation (i.e. the marginal cost of public funds)
should never play a role in second-best policy rules, as long as the income tax is optimized.
This result holds true without changing the entire tax schedule to neutralize the distributional
impact of the public good and without imposing weak separability on preferences. The standard
ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods is obtained in second-best
with optimal non-linear taxation under homogeneous preferences and weak separability between
labor and commodities in the utility function. When the government can only optimize a linear
income tax, not only are homogeneous preferences and separability required, but also the absence
of income eﬀects in labor supply.
Finally, this paper contributes to the optimal tax literature on optimal (non-linear) taxation
and public-goods provision, as in Christiansen (1981), Boadway and Keen (1993), Kaplow (1996)
and Sandmo (1998), that assumed identical utility functions for all agents. This paper allows
for fully general preference structures, which can be dependent on skill levels.5 As the marginal
rate of substitution between public and private goods (i.e., the marginal willingness to pay
for public goods) is allowed to vary with skill type, it is possible to explore whether public
goods should be employed for redistributional purposes alongside the optimal non-linear income
tax. It is demonstrated that preference heterogeneity does not fundamentally aﬀect the optimal
policy rules under linear income taxation and public-goods provision. However, under non-linear
income taxation, public-goods provision is also determined by distributional concerns, which is
a novel ﬁnding compared to the literature assuming homogeneous preferences. In particular, if
the marginal willingness to pay for the public good declines with earning ability, the government
will provide more public goods, compared to the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule for public-goods
provision. The reverse reasoning holds if the willingness to pay for public goods increases with
earning ability.6
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 is devoted to optimal taxation, optimal provision of public goods, and the marginal cost of
public funds in heterogeneous-agent settings under linear tax instruments. Section 4 discusses
optimal taxation and public-goods provision under non-linear taxation. Section 5 discusses the
results and Section 6 concludes.
4Kreiner and Verdelin (2010) elaborate on the consequence of non-separable and heterogeneous preferences in
similar settings.
5This paper is related to Kreiner and Verdelin (2010). These authors explore optimal public good provision
with heterogeneous preferences with sub-optimal non-linear income taxation.
6These ﬁndings extend the earlier results of Saez (2002) on optimal commodity taxation with preference
heterogeneity to optimal public-goods provision with preference heterogeneity.
62 Model
A static neoclassical general equilibrium model is considered consisting of households, ﬁrms and
a government. It is based on earlier contributions by Ramsey (1927), Mirrlees (1971), Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971), Sheshinski (1972), Diamond (1975), Christiansen (1981), Boadway and
Keen (1993), Kaplow (1996) and Sandmo (1998). Heterogeneous households diﬀer in their
earnings capacity and maximize utility by demanding consumption goods and supplying labor
eﬀort. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms produce private goods and public goods. Both labor and goods
markets are perfectly competitive, so that households and ﬁrms take wage rates and goods prices
as given. The government maximizes social welfare by optimally setting taxes and public-goods
provision while taking into account all behavioral responses of households and ﬁrms.
Attention is initially focused on the optimal setting of linear tax instruments. Later, also
optimal non-linear taxation is explored. Real-world tax systems are neither completely ﬂat, nor
completely non-linear. Hence, from a practical point of view it is useful to explore both cases.
Moreover, linear tax systems are much less demanding in terms of information. Consequently,
it is also of theoretical importance to explore whether the results are robust to reducing the
amount of information available to the government; linear tax systems only require veriﬁability
of aggregate labor earnings, whereas non-linear tax systems require veriﬁability of individual
earnings. Since household earnings ability is assumed to be unveriﬁable to the government, the
government cannot employ individualized lump-sum taxes or transfers.
2.1 Households
There is a mass N of households, which may diﬀer by a single-dimensional parameter n 2 N =
[n;n], where the upper bound n could be inﬁnite. n denotes the household’s earning ability
(‘skill level’) and represents the endowment of eﬃciency units of labor of each household. The
density of household types with index n is denoted by f(n) and the cumulative distribution
function by F(n). Note that N
R
N f(n)dn = N.
Each household n derives utility u(n) from consumption c(n), and pure public goods G. It
derives disutility from labor l(n). Each household has an endowment of time, which is allocated
between leisure and working. Consumption and leisure are both assumed to be normal goods.
Preferences can be heterogeneous, as the utility function may depend on the skill level n. This
generalizes the previously mentioned papers on optimal taxation and public-goods provision that
assume homogeneous preferences.
The utility function satisﬁes the Inada conditions, is strictly concave, and is twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable:
u(n)  u(c(n);l(n);G;n); uc; ul;uG > 0; ucc;ull;uGG < 0; 8n: (1)
Subscripts denote partial derivatives. The Spence-Mirrlees conditions are imposed on the utility
function so as to guarantee the implementability of the non-linear policies derived in the next
section (see also Lemma 2 below). No other restrictions are imposed on the derivatives of the
7utility function.
All skill types are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production; hence, the skill price per
eﬃciency unit of labor is equal across households and denoted by w.7 The government employs
a linear tax schedule consisting of a linear tax rate t on gross labor earnings z(n)  wnl(n),
a linear tax rate  on consumption goods c(n), and a non-individualized lump-sum transfer
T. The informational assumptions for linear taxes are that the government should be able
to verify aggregate labor income or consumption. Note that in Mirrlees (1971)-analyses non-
individualized lump-sum transfers are always part of the instrument set of the government, since
the government can always provide each household with an equal amount of resources.
The household budget constraint states that expenditures on consumption are equal to net
labor earnings plus non-individualized lump-sum transfers:
(1 + )c(n) = (1   t)z(n) + T; 8n: (2)
One tax instrument is redundant, since the consumption tax is equivalent to the income tax.
Thus, without loss of generality, one tax instrument can always be normalized to zero.
The household maximizes utility (1) subject to its budget constraint (2). This yields the







Taxation is distortionary as it drives a wedge between the marginal social beneﬁts (wn) and
the marginal private beneﬁts (
(1 t)wn
(1+) ) of an increase in labor eﬀort. Higher levels of taxation
(income or consumption taxes) reduce the price of leisure in terms of consumption goods and
households substitute leisure for consumption.
Indirect utility of household n can be written as: v(n)  v(t;;T;G;n)  u(^ c(n);^ l(n);G;n),
where hats denote the optimized values for consumption and labor supply. Straightforward











uc , where (n) is the private marginal utility of income
of household n.
Some additional notation is introduced to express the optimal policy rules in terms of well-
known elasticity concepts. In particular, the compensated, uncompensated and income elas-
ticities of labor supply and consumption demand with respect to the tax rates and the public
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7The results in this paper are conditional on the assumption that all labor types are perfect substitutes in
production. Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) demonstrate that the Samuelson rule is modiﬁed (further) to capture
the eﬀect of policy-induced general equilibrium eﬀects on the wage structure. No general statements can be made
with regard to the direction in which the optimal taxes or the provision of public goods should be adjusted. This
depends on cross-substitution patterns in the production function(s).
8Under linear instruments, ﬁrst-order conditions are both necessary and suﬃcient to describe the maximum
of utility given the restrictions on the derivatives of the utility function. Under non-linear policies, monotonicity
and Spence-Mirrlees conditions are required for a maximum; see also section 4.3.
8and "cT  (1 + )
@c(n)
@T > 0, where the superscript u (c) denotes an uncompensated (compen-










































Rewriting the Slutsky equations yields "u
lt = "c
lt   "lT, "u
c = "c









!c "lT, where !G 
uGG
u , !l 
 ull(n)
u and !c 
ucc(n)
u denote the shares of public
goods, labor and consumption in utility. In the remainder of the paper, a bar is used to indicate









A representative ﬁrm produces private and public goods, taking prices for inputs and outputs as
given.9 C denotes aggregate output of consumption goods. The price of the consumption good
is normalized to one without loss of generality, whereas the price of the public good is denoted
by p. The ﬁrm operates linear production technologies for both goods, with labor being the only
input in production:10
C = LC; G = ALG; A > 0: (8)
LC and LG denote labor input in consumption and public-goods production, respectively. Labor
eﬃciency in consumption-goods production is harmlessly normalized to one. A therefore denotes
the relative labor eﬃciency of public-goods production. The zero-proﬁt condition ensures that
the equilibrium-wage rate equals unity (w = 1). In addition, the relative price of public goods
is constant and equals the marginal rate of transformation between public and private goods
(p = 1=A). The relative price of public goods p is larger (smaller) than one if public-goods
production is less (more) eﬃcient than private-goods production: A < 1 (A > 1).
2.3 Government
The government’s objectives are represented by a Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function,





0 (u(n)) > 0; 	
00 (u(n))  0: (9)
9Alternatively, we could assume that there is a separate public ﬁrm producing the public good, but this does
not aﬀect any of the results Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
10In the absence of constant returns to scale, a perfect proﬁt tax is required to preserve the results of this
paper; see also Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
9Maximizing social welfare under a Utilitarian criterion (	0 = 1) implies a social preference for
redistribution if the private marginal utility of income (n) declines with skill n at the household
level. However, due to the concavity of 	(:) the government may exhibit a stronger preference
for redistribution than households do.





(tz(n) + c(n))dF(n) = NT + pG: (10)
2.4 General equilibrium
Clearing of both labor and goods markets requires that total labor demand LC + LG equals
total labor supply, and that total supply of private consumption goods equals total demand for
private consumption goods:








3 Optimal linear taxation and public-goods provision
The government maximizes social welfare subject to its budget constraint by choosing the non-
individualized lump-sum transfer, the tax rate on income or consumption and the level of public-
goods provision. Optimal policies are derived with both tax normalizations (i.e., either consump-
tion or income remains untaxed). The social marginal value of one unit of public resources is
denoted by .









(tnl(n) + c(n))dF(n)   NT   pG

; (13)




























































dF(n)   p = 0; (17)
where Roy’s lemma has been used in each ﬁrst-order condition, and w = 1 is imposed.11
11Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) point out that the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary, but not generally
suﬃcient, to characterize the optimum. In the remainder it’s assumed that the second-order conditions for
103.1 Marginal cost of public funds – The standard approach
This section ﬁrst derives optimal policies using the standard concept for the marginal cost of
funds. To that end, the following deﬁnitions are introduced: marginal social value of private
income, the marginal cost of public funds, and the Feldstein (1972) distributional characteristics
of the tax bases and public goods.
Deﬁnition 1 Standard deﬁnition of the social marginal value of private income – The social
marginal value of one unit of private income accruing to household n equals

0(n)  	
0 (u(n))(n); 8n: (18)
According to the traditional deﬁnition, the social marginal value of private income is captured
by the mechanical increase in social welfare of transferring one unit of resources to household n.
Private welfare rises with (n), and this increase in private welfare is valued by the government
by 	0 (u(n)).
Deﬁnition 2 Marginal cost of public funds – The marginal cost of public funds based on the






The traditional marginal cost of public funds MCF 0 is the ratio of the social marginal value
of public resources  and the average of the social marginal value of private income 0(n).
Deﬁnition 3 Distributional characteristics of the tax bases – The distributional characteristics
0
y of tax bases y(n) = fz(n);c(n)g are given by

0









y represents the gain in social welfare (expressed in monetary equivalents and then divided by
the taxed base) of redistributing a marginal unit of resources through base y(n) = fz(n);c(n)g.
The distributional characteristics of the tax bases are positive, since the covariance between tax
base y(n) and the social welfare weights 0(n) are negative. Households with higher incomes
or consumption levels feature lower welfare weights because the social marginal utility of in-
come is diminishing due to diminishing private marginal utility of income and/or concavity of
the social welfare function. The positive distributional characteristic 0
y therefore implies that
redistribution through taxing income or consumption yields distributional beneﬁts. A stronger
social desire for redistribution of welfare or greater inequality in the skill distribution raises the
distributional characteristic. Since 0
y is a positive normalized covariance, it ranges between zero
and one. 0
y = 0 is obtained either if the government is not interested in redistribution and
attaches the same social welfare weights 0(n) to all households or if the base y(n) is the same
maximization of social welfare are always satisﬁed.
11for all n so that there is no inequality. 0
y = 1 if the government pursues a Rawlsian social welfare
function.
Deﬁnition 4 Distributional characteristic of the public good – The distributional characteristic
of the public good is

0












The distributional characteristic for the public good 0
G is the negative normalized covariance




G > 0 if the public good mainly beneﬁts the rich, who feature the lowest social
welfare weights 0(n), and vice versa. 0
G = 0 if the government is not interested in redistribution
and attaches the same welfare weights 0(n) to all households or if all households beneﬁt equally
from the public good, so that
uG
uc is equal for all n.
The next lemma derives the marginal excess burden of the income (or consumption) tax. The
excess burden measures the reduction in social welfare, measured in monetary units, expressed
as a fraction of the tax base, of raising the distortionary income or consumption tax.
Lemma 1 Marginal excess burden – The marginal excess burdens for the income tax and the












Proof. The welfare eﬀect of a rise in the tax rate is evaluated, while public-goods provision
remains constant. All revenue raised from household n is transferred back to household n through
a household-speciﬁc lump-sum transfer s(n).12 All welfare changes are converted in monetary
equivalents and then summed over all households without discounting for utility diﬀerences
through the social welfare function 	(:). This ensures that only the eﬃciency losses of the
distorting tax are valued and not its distributional gains. To determine the excess burden of the
income tax, assume that  = 0. The change in taxes dt and lump-sum income ds(n) for each






dt, which leaves the public budget unaﬀected.
The change in utility of household n is given by dv(n) = (n)ds(n)   (n)nl(n)dt, where Roy’s




ltnl(n). Since each household
gets compensated for the tax change, the behavioral response is measured by the compensated
labor supply elasticity. The change in social welfare (expressed in monetary units) is the sum




(n) dF(n). Hence, the
marginal excess burden of the tax (expressed in monetary equivalents, as a fraction of the tax














12Of course this instrument does not exist, since it boils down to an individualized lump-sum tax. However,
this thought-exercise allows us to calculate the excess burden of the tax.
12Recall that the bar indicates an income-weighted elasticity. Using similar steps and setting t = 0














Proposition 1 replicates Sandmo (1998) by characterizing optimal tax policies and public-
goods provision under the standard concept for the marginal cost of funds, and assuming that
the consumption tax is normalized to zero. Sandmo (1998) adds distributional concerns to the
analysis of Atkinson and Stern (1974). The ﬁrst-order conditions for T (14) and t (15) both
yield a measure for the marginal cost of public funds. Therefore, MCF 0
T and MCF 0
t are used
to denote the marginal cost of public funds of the lump-sum tax and the tax rate, respectively;
see also Sandmo (1998).
Proposition 1 With the standard MCF deﬁnition, and with the consumption tax normalized to
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t < 1: (28)
Proof. Equation (14) can be simpliﬁed by setting  = 0 and substituting equation (19) to ﬁnd
equation (26). Equation (15) is simpliﬁed by using equation (20) and setting  = 0 to ﬁnd the
ﬁrst part of equation (27). The second part of (27) follows upon substitution of the Slutsky
equation  "u
lt =  "c
lt    "lT and using equation (22). Equation (17) is simpliﬁed by using equation
(21), setting  = 0, and using t  Nt
R
N nl(n)dF(n)=pG to ﬁnd equation (25).
Equation (25) is the modiﬁed Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods. The
modiﬁed Samuelson rule equates the sum of the marginal social beneﬁts with the marginal social




uc dF(n) are deﬂated by the distributional
characteristic of the public good 0
G. If poor households value the public good more (less) than
rich households do, then 0
G < 0 (0
G > 0). In that case, the level of public-goods provision
increases (decreases) – ceteris paribus. The right-hand side gives the marginal cost of providing
the public good. p equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the
reference private good. The cost side of the Samuelson rule is corrected for tax distortions via
the marginal cost of funds MCF 0. A higher cost of public funds lowers the level of public-goods
provision – ceteris paribus. Providing the public good may exacerbate (reduce) pre-existing
labor-tax distortions if the public good reduces (stimulates) labor supply. This correction is
governed by the uncompensated cross-elasticity of labor with the public good (if  "u
lG 6= 0); see
13also Atkinson and Stern (1974). t  Nt
R
N z(n)dF(n)=pG denotes the share of public goods
that is ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes. If t = 1, then public goods are ﬁnanced exclusively
with distortionary taxes. If the public good and labor supply are complementary ( "u
lG > 0), the
provision of the public good boosts labor supply and this raises tax revenue in the presence of
a positive labor tax (t > 0). These positive revenue eﬀects decrease the cost of public-goods
provision. If the public good reduces labor supply ( "u
lG < 0), the cost of the public good rises,
since the public good reduces labor supply, which erodes the labor tax base.
Equation (26) gives the marginal cost of funds for the lump-sum tax. If there is a positive
income tax (t > 0), the marginal cost of funds for the lump-sum tax is always smaller than one
(MCF 0
T < 1), as long as leisure is a normal good (~ "lT < 0). Intuitively, transferring an extra
unit of funds from households to the government via a larger lump-sum tax generates an income
eﬀect in labor supply, and this raises tax revenues from the income tax if it is positive (t > 0).
However, one would expect the lump-sum tax to have a marginal cost of funds equal to one.
The result that the lump-sum tax does not have a marginal cost of funds of unity is the ﬁrst
problem that is identiﬁed in the literature.
Equation (27) gives the marginal cost of funds for the tax rate (MCF 0
t). MCF 0
t depends
on the income-weighted uncompensated tax elasticity of labor supply  "u
lt. The sign of this
elasticity is ambiguous due to oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects.13 Clearly, by allowing for
distributional concerns (0
z > 0), distortionary taxes have not only costs, but also distributional
beneﬁts. These distributional gains lower the marginal cost of funds for the distortionary income
tax.
In Ramsey (1927) frameworks the non-individualized lump-sum tax is ruled out and distribu-
tional concerns are absent. Hence, MCFT is not applicable and 0
z = 0 in MCF 0
t; see also Atkin-
son and Stern (1974). MCF 0
t > 1 is then obtained if the labor supply curve is upward-sloping in
wages ( "u
lt < 0) and MCF 0
t < 1 if there is a backward-bending labor supply curve ( "u
lt > 0). In
the absence of distributional concerns (i.e., 0
z = 0), equation (27) demonstrates that it is impos-
sible to relate the marginal cost of public funds of the distortionary income tax to the marginal
excess burden of the income tax, as suggested by the analyses in Pigou (1947), Harberger (1964)
and Browning (1976). The often-used approximation that the marginal cost of funds equals one
plus the marginal excess burden of the tax will only apply as long as income eﬀects are absent
in labor supply ( "lT = 0), since then  "c
lt =  "u
lt and MCF 0
t = [1   MEBt]
 1  1 + MEBt at
low levels of t. However, assuming away income eﬀects is theoretically not very appealing and
is not empirically warranted; see also Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Thus, in the absence of
distributional beneﬁts of taxes, the marginal cost of funds of the distortionary tax is not directly
related to the excess burden of the tax instrument. This is the second problem in the literature
on the marginal cost of public funds.
The results that (in the absence of redistributional concerns) the MCF 0
t can be smaller than
one and that it cannot be directly related to the marginal excess burden of the tax led to a large
literature trying to resolve these counterintuitive ﬁndings; see for example Triest (1990), Ballard
13Most empirical studies conducted in recent decades suggest a positive value for the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply, implying that MCF0
t will exceed one; see, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
14and Fullerton (1992) and Dahlby (2008).
Equation (28) states that, in a second-best optimum, the marginal cost of funds for all tax
instruments should be equalized (i.e., MCF 0 = MCF 0
T = MCF 0
t). Consequently, the marginal
cost of funds at the optimal tax system is smaller than one. Note that this result holds as long
as there is a positive labor tax, irrespective of whether there are distributional concerns or not.
This ﬁnding led Sandmo (1998) to conclude that in a second-best setting with redistributional
concerns, the marginal cost of public funds is lower than one, rather than higher than one.
The next proposition demonstrates that the standard deﬁnition for the marginal cost of funds
is highly sensitive to the normalization of the tax system. In particular, it gives the optimality
conditions for the tax system and public-goods provision when the income tax is normalized to
zero and consumption is taxed, instead. In this case, MCF 0
T and MCF 0
 are used to denote the
marginal cost of public funds of the lump-sum tax and the consumption tax rate that follow
from ﬁrst-order conditions (14) and (16), respectively.
Proposition 2 With the standard MCF deﬁnition, and with the income tax normalized to zero,
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 > 1: (32)
Proof. Equation (14) can be simpliﬁed by setting t = 0 and substituting equation (19) to ﬁnd
equation (30). Equation (15) is simpliﬁed by using equation (20), and setting t = 0 to ﬁnd the
ﬁrst part of equation (31). The second part of (31) follows upon substitution of the Slutsky
equation  "u
c =  "c
c    "cT and using equation (22). Equation (17) is simpliﬁed by using equation
(21), setting t = 0, and using   N
R
N c(n)dF(n)=pG to ﬁnd equation (29).
The interpretations of equations (29) and (31) are identical to those of (25) and (27) that
appear below proposition 1. Hence, these will not be repeated.
Equation (30) reveals that the marginal cost of funds for the lump-sum transfer is now always
higher than (or equal to) one, rather than always smaller than (or equal to) one under income
taxation. The reason is that the income elasticity of consumption is positive (if consumption is
a normal good): ~ "cT > 0. Hence, MCF 0
T switches from a number below one, to a number above
one, when a diﬀerent normalization of the tax system is adopted.
In Ramsey (1927) frameworks with a representative agent (0
c = 0) and no lump-sum taxes,
equation (31) gives the marginal cost of funds. It reveals that MCF 0
 > 1, since substitution
eﬀects and income eﬀects in consumption demand are reinforcing rather than oﬀsetting. Con-
sequently, the marginal cost of funds for the distortionary tax under income normalization is
always larger than one, whereas it could be smaller than one under consumption normaliza-
15tion. Hence, the marginal cost of funds for the distortionary tax instrument is larger under
consumption taxation than under income taxation.14
In the presence of distributional concerns (0
c > 0), equation (32) shows that at the optimal
tax system the marginal cost of funds for all tax instruments are equalized. As a result, MCF 0
is larger than one when consumption is taxed, and MCF 0 is smaller than one if income is taxed.
A diﬀerent normalization of the tax system therefore produces completely diﬀerent marginal
cost of funds measures for both lump-sum and distortionary taxes. However, the normalization
of the tax system does not inﬂuence the optimal second-best allocation. This is the third problem
with the standard marginal cost of funds measures.
The normalization explains the ﬁndings of Wilson (1991) and Sandmo (1998). They both
suggest that distributional concerns explain why the marginal cost of public funds is smaller
than one. However, their ﬁndings stem from the normalization of the tax system, and would be
reversed if consumption would be taken as the tax base, as proposition 4 demonstrates.
To summarize, the standard MCF measure suﬀers from three defects. Firstly, the marginal
cost of funds for lump-sum taxes are not equal to one – irrespective of the normalization of the
tax system. Secondly, in the absence of distributional concerns the marginal cost of funds for
a distortionary tax instrument cannot be related to the excess burden of the tax instrument –
irrespective of the normalization of the tax system. Hence, the MCF measure does not properly
capture the welfare costs of taxation. Thirdly, the MCF measures for both distortionary and
lump-sum taxes are shown to be critically sensitive to the normalization of the tax system. All
these problems are suggestive of a conceptually ﬂawed MCF measure. From a practical point
of view, these problems render the standard MCF measures useless in any applied analysis.
3.2 Marginal cost of public funds – The Diamond approach
This section argues that the three problems with the standard MCF measures can be resolved by
appropriately specifying the social value of private income, which is used in the deﬁnition of the
marginal cost of funds. In particular, it is argued that the social value of private income should
also include the income eﬀects on the taxed bases, as in Diamond (1975). If the government
transfers one unit of funds to the private sector, it should not only take into account the direct
utility gains to households – as the standard measure does – but also include the indirect eﬀect of
a higher transfer on other tax revenues as social losses (under income taxation) or gains (under
consumption taxation).
According to the traditional approach, the income eﬀects on the taxed bases are not included
in the social valuation of one unit of private income. Therefore, the problem with the traditional
deﬁnition is that it compares the social marginal value of public income to the private marginal
value of private income – up to a transformation of the latter through the social welfare function
if non-utilitarian social preferences are adopted. If the marginal cost of public funds is based on
14The sensitivity of MCF0 to the normalization of the tax system was already pointed out by Atkinson and
Stern (1974) without using the MCF terminology, however. In particular, MCF0 can be shown to be bigger
(smaller) than one if consumption goods (factor supplies) are taxed, and factor supplies (consumption goods) are
not taxed.
16the economically more intuitive deﬁnition for the social marginal value of private income based
on Diamond (1975), then it correctly compares the social marginal value of public income to the
social marginal value of private income. It will be demonstrated that the traditional deﬁnition
of the marginal cost of public funds is indeed conceptually problematic, and the three problems
identiﬁed above are nulliﬁed using the Diamond-based approach to the marginal cost of public
funds. The social value of private income based on Diamond (1975) is thus deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 Diamond’s deﬁnition of the social marginal value of private income – The social
marginal value of one unit of private income accruing to household n equals
(n)  	







The direct utility eﬀect is still measured by 	0 (u(n))(n). In addition, transferring one
unit of funds to the household reduces labor supply (
@l(n)
@T < 0) and raises consumption demand
(
@c(n)
@T > 0), since leisure and consumption are assumed to be normal goods. Hence, the gov-
ernment loses tn
@l(n)
@T in tax revenues from the income tax (if t > 0) or gains 
@c(n)
@T in revenues
from the consumption tax (if  > 0). The welfare eﬀects are obtained by multiplication of the
revenue changes with , the social marginal value of one unit of public resources. Adopting (n)
as the social marginal value of private income makes it possible to deﬁne the marginal cost of
funds.
Deﬁnition 6 Marginal cost of public funds – The marginal cost of public funds based on the





Analogously to the traditional marginal cost of public funds, the Diamond-based measure
for the marginal cost of funds MCF is deﬁned as the ratio of the social marginal value of
public resources  and the average social marginal value of private income (n). Similarly, the
deﬁnitions for the distributional characteristics can be adjusted using (n) instead of 0(n) as
the social welfare weights.
Deﬁnition 7 Distributional characteristics of the tax bases – The distributional characteristics
y of tax bases y(n) = fz(n);c(n)g based on the Diamond measure of the social marginal value
of income are given by








Deﬁnition 8 Distributional characteristic of the public good – The distributional characteristic
of the public good based on the Diamond measure of the social marginal value of income is












17Using the new deﬁnitions, the optimal policies under income taxation are expressed as follows.
Proposition 3 Under the Diamond based MCF deﬁnition, and the consumption tax normalized







dF(n) = (1   t "
c
lG)  p; (37)










MCF = MCFT = MCFt = 1: (40)
Proof. Equation (14) can be simpliﬁed by setting  = 0 and substituting equation (34) to ﬁnd






@T , and setting  = 0 to ﬁnd the ﬁrst part of equation (39). The second part









@T , setting  = 0, and using t  Nt
R
N nl(n)dF(n)=pG
to ﬁnd equation (37).
Equation (37) reveals that the modiﬁed Samuelson rule is almost the same as before, except
that the compensated cross-elasticity of labor supply with respect to public goods  "c
lG enters the
expression (rather than the uncompensated cross-elasticity). The compensated cross-elasticity
is a diﬀerent measure than the uncompensated cross elasticity. Whereas the uncompensated
elasticity is zero with utility functions exhibiting (weak) separability between public goods and
labor (leisure), the compensated cross-elasticity is generally diﬀerent from zero and positive for a
wide class of utility functions including the separable ones; see Jacobs (2009). However, the most
important diﬀerence with proposition 1 is that there should be no correction for the marginal
cost of funds on the cost side of the modiﬁed Samuelson rule. Consequently, tax distortions
do not aﬀect the decision rule for the optimal supply of public goods. Although the decision
rule does not contain a correction for the marginal cost of funds in second-best, the level of
public-goods provision is generally diﬀerent, since the allocations are not identical in ﬁrst- and
second-best.
Equation (38) demonstrates that, at the optimal tax system, the marginal cost of funds for
the lump-sum tax (MCFT) is always equal to one. The ﬁnding that the marginal cost of public
funds is equal to one is therefore merely a statement that the tax system is optimal. Intuitively,
transferring one unit of resources from the private to the public sector yields exactly one unit
in terms of average social beneﬁts. Thus, at the optimum, the government should be indiﬀerent
between transferring funds from the public to the private sector. Hence, the ﬁrst problem that
the lump-sum tax does not have a marginal cost of public funds equal to one is resolved.
Equation (39) shows that in Ramsey (1927) analyses without lump-sum taxes and redistri-
butional concerns (z = 0) the marginal cost of public funds for the distortionary tax would
be directly related to the marginal excess burden of the tax. Indeed, it is exactly equal to the
inverse of 1 MEBt. This ﬁnding resolves the second problem that there is no link between the
18marginal cost of public funds and the excess burden of taxation. Indeed, by failing to account
for the income eﬀects on taxed bases in the social marginal value of private income, these income
eﬀects pop up in the expression for the marginal cost of funds; see equation (27).
However, in Mirrlees (1971) analyses, the government only introduces distortionary taxes if
this contributes to equality (i.e., if taxing labor income yields distributional beneﬁts). With
distributional concerns, z > 0, MCFt is lowered, as equation (39) reveals. At the optimal tax
system, the marginal cost of funds for the income tax should be equal to the marginal cost of
funds for the lump-sum tax, as (40) demonstrates. Therefore, the deadweight losses of income
taxes should be exactly equal to the distributional gains: MEBt = t
1 t "c
lt = z. At the optimum,
the marginal excess burden of a distorting tax rate (expressed in monetary units, as a percentage
of taxed income) exactly equals the marginal beneﬁts of redistribution (expressed in monetary
units, as a percentage of taxed income). Tax distortions are therefore only introduced insofar
as these distortions contribute to a more equal distribution of welfare. The more society cares
about distribution, the larger is z and the higher is the optimal income tax. The more elastically
labor supply responds to taxes, the larger   "c
lt will be, and the lower will be the optimal income
tax. This is the standard trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency.
Naturally, there should be no correction of the modiﬁed Samuelson rule (37) if the public
good is ﬁnanced at the margin with the lump-sum tax, since there is no deadweight loss involved.
However, neither should it contain a correction if the marginal source of ﬁnance for the public
good is the distortionary tax instrument. This is an application of the Envelope Theorem: the
deadweight loss of a marginally higher tax rate exactly cancels against the distributional gain if
the tax rate is optimally set.
The marginal excess burden of the income tax is therefore the price of equality and not the
price of public-goods provision. Tax distortions are not introduced for public-goods provision. If
the government would not be interested in redistribution, the distributional characteristic would
be zero z = 0, and the marginal excess burden would be zero, since distortionary tax rates
would be optimally zero. Thus, in the absence of a preference for redistribution, all public goods
would be ﬁnanced with non-distortionary non-individualized taxes.
Correctly specifying the marginal cost of public funds has thus been necessary to prove that
the marginal cost of funds should not play a role in the Samuelson rule for optimal linear income
taxation. By using the traditional deﬁnition one could get the impression that the Samuelson rule
contains corrections for both tax distortions and distributional gains associated with taxation,
as in Sandmo (1998).
The next proposition demonstrates that all results remain valid also using the diﬀerent nor-
malization with consumption taxes rather than income taxes.
Proposition 4 Under the Diamond based MCF deﬁnition, and with the income tax normal-
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MCF = MCFT = MCF = 1: (44)
Proof. Equation (14) can be simpliﬁed by setting t = 0 and substituting equation (34) to






@T , and setting t = 0 to ﬁnd the ﬁrst part of equation (43). The second part









@T , setting t = 0, and using   N
R
N c(n)dF(n)=pG
to ﬁnd equation (41).
Proposition 4 demonstrates that the marginal cost of funds measures have become inde-
pendent from the particular normalization of the tax system. At the optimal tax system, the
marginal cost of funds remains equal to one for all tax instruments, and the excess burden of
the consumption tax still equals its distributional gain 
1+  "c
c = c. Hence, the characterization
of the optimal policy rules has become independent from the particular tax normalization.
The marginal excess burdens of consumption and income taxes – as deﬁned in Lemma 1 – are
not quantitatively identical under diﬀerent tax normalizations in the absence of distributional
concerns (z = c = 0), even though allocations are; see also Håkonsen (1998). The contribu-
tions by Triest (1990) and Dahlby (2008) are related. If there are no distributional concerns,
and lump-sum taxes are ruled out (as in Håkonsen (1998)), then MCFt = (1   MEBt)
 1 6=
MCF = (1   MEB)
 1, even if the Diamond concept of the social marginal value of private
income is adopted. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, Triest (1990), Håkonsen (1998) and
Dahlby (2008) develop alternative MCF concepts relying on correcting the MCF measures for
the shadow values of public resources (), both before and after the introduction of distortionary
taxes. However, the explanation for the diﬀerence in the MCF measures is that the marginal
excess burdens are expressed in terms of diﬀerent tax bases. At identical allocations, both tax
instruments have equal marginal excess burdens in absolute terms, but these excess burdens are
expressed as fractions of diﬀerent tax bases. Hence, the MEB measures diﬀer quantitatively.
Once distributional concerns are included, this issue has become moot, since the marginal dis-
tributional beneﬁts of each distorting tax instrument are expressed as a fraction of the same tax
base as the excess burden of the tax instrument. At the optimal tax system, marginal distor-
tionary costs and marginal distributional gains are equal, and the normalization of the costs or
beneﬁts of the tax instrument with a particular tax base becomes immaterial.
The next proposition derives a special case in which the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule for public-
goods provision is obtained in second-best settings with distortionary taxation.
Proposition 5 If private utility is given by u(n)  c(n)   v (l(n)) +  (G), v0; 0 > 0, v00 > 0,
 00  0, then the optimal provision of public goods follows the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule in second-
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lG = 0. Furthermore,
uG
uc =  0 (G) is independent from skill n; hence, G = 0. Substitution of
"c
lG = 0 and G = 0 in (37) or (41) yields the result.
The public good does not raise or lower compensated labor supply. Therefore, the public
good cannot be used to alleviate the tax distortions on labor supply. Similarly, the public good
does not aﬀect the welfare distribution, since every household beneﬁts to an equal extent from
the public good. Indeed, the public good is a perfect substitute for the lump-sum cash transfer
T. Since the provision of the public good neither aﬀects eﬃciency nor equity, provision of the
public good should follow the ﬁrst-best policy rule. This simple special case demonstrates why
it is misleading to ignore distributional concerns in the analysis of the marginal cost of public
funds; the cost side of the Samuelson rule would be multiplied with MCF, whereas the beneﬁts
of the distortionary tax would be left out of the picture.
3.3 Sub-optimal taxation
To conclude the section on linear taxation, suppose that the government cannot optimize the
lump-sum tax, and has to resort to distortionary income taxation as the marginal source of
ﬁnance for public goods. The following proposition derives the marginal cost of public funds
and the Samuelson rule for public goods provision.
Proposition 6 Under the Diamond based MCF deﬁnition, the lump-sum tax exogenously given,
and the consumption tax normalized to zero, the optimal rule for public-goods provision and the






dF(n) = (1   t "
c










Proof. See Proposition 3.
The modiﬁed Samuelson rule contains a correction for both the excess burden and the dis-
tributional beneﬁts of the distortionary tax that is used to ﬁnance the public good. The dis-
tributional beneﬁts are omitted in models adopting a representative agent. Clearly, when the
lump-sum tax cannot be optimized, the marginal cost of public funds ceases to be equal to one.
However, whether it is bigger or smaller than one depends on the distributional and eﬃciency
eﬀects of the tax rate. If the income tax is sub-optimally low (high) from a distributional per-
spective (z > (<)MEBt), then the marginal cost of public funds is smaller (bigger) than one,
and optimal public goods provision is larger (smaller), everything else equal. If the income tax
21is optimized, both the distributional gains and the deadweight losses cancel in the second-best
modiﬁed Samuelson rule.
4 Optimal non-linear taxation and public-goods provision
The analysis has this far been conﬁned to linear policy instruments. In the real world, however,
most tax systems are non-linear. This section explores the optimal provision of public goods
under optimal non-linear taxes; as in Mirrlees (1971).
4.1 Households
Let the non-linear tax schedule be denoted by T (z(n)), where T 0(z(n)) 
dT(z(n))
dz(n) denotes the
marginal income tax rate at income z(n). The government observes only the total income of a
household (z(n) = nl(n)), not its labor supply l(n) or ability n, which rules out individualized
lump-sum taxes. The household budget constraint is modiﬁed:
c(n) = z(n)   T(z(n)); 8n: (48)
The ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply of each household reads as
 ul(c(n);l(n);G;n)
uc(c(n);l(n);G;n)
= (1   T
0 (z(n)))n; 8n: (49)
4.2 Government
The social welfare function remains the same as in (9). In the Mirrlees setup it is more convenient
to work with the economy’s resource constraint rather than the government budget constraint.15




(nl(n)   c(n))dF(n) = pG: (50)
4.3 Incentive compatibility
To determine the non-linear policy schedule T (:), a standard mechanism-design approach is
adopted. First, the revelation principle is used to derive the optimal direct mechanism, which
induces households to reveal their ability truthfully through self-selection. This direct mechanism
yields the optimal second-best allocation. Then, this allocation is decentralized as the outcome
of a competitive equilibrium by employing the non-linear policy income tax T (:).
Any second-best allocation must satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints. Since n is
not observable by the government, every bundle fc(n);z(n)g for household n must be such that
each household self-selects into this bundle and does not prefer another bundle fc(m);z(m)g
15If the government maximizes social welfare subject to the resource constraint, and all households respect
their budget constraints, then the government budget constraint is automatically satisﬁed by Walras’ law.
22intended for household m 6= n. By adopting the ﬁrst-order approach, as in Mirrlees (1971), the







The ﬁrst-order approach yields an implementable allocation only if the second-order con-
ditions for utility maximization are fulﬁlled at the optimum allocation. Lemma 2 states the
conditions under which the ﬁrst-order approach is both necessary and suﬃcient for a welfare
optimum.
Lemma 2 Second-order incentive-compatibility – The optimal allocation derived under the ﬁrst-







satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees condition; i.e.,
d( Uz=Uc)
dn < 0; and ii) gross in-
comes are non-decreasing with skill n; i.e.,
dz(n)
dn  0.
Proof. Deﬁne the net utility 
(m;n) of an n-type mimicking an m-type as 
(m;n) 
U(c(m);z(m);G;n)   U(c(n);z(n);G;n). Under a direct mechanism, each household reports
an ability-type to the government. Each report m is associated with a commodity bundle








dm = 0. The second-order condition for this problem is
@2
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@m@n = 0. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition with









dm . The second-order condition for incentive-










































Suﬃcient conditions for second-order incentive-compatibility are therefore:
d( Uz=Uc)
dn < 0, and
dz(n)
dn  0.
Lemma 2 implies that the second-order conditions are locally satisﬁed. It is a standard result
in the Mirrlees model without public goods provision, see also ?, Ebert (1992), and ?. Since
the public good is identical for all agents, incentive compatibility constraints are not aﬀected
by introducing public goods, see also Kreiner and Verdelin (2010). Even if diﬀerent individuals
exhibit a diﬀerent valuation for the public good, one individual cannot mimic another individual’s
ability to beneﬁt from the public good, since his utility function remains the same. In the
remainder of this paper it’s assumed that Lemma 2 holds.
234.4 Optimal taxation and public-goods provision























dn + (n)u(n)   (n)u(n):
(n) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the diﬀerential equation for utility in equation
(51).  is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. The transversality conditions for
this optimal control problem are given by limn!n (n) = 0, and limn!n (n) = 0. The ﬁrst-order
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dn = 0: (55)
The following proposition provides the conditions for the optimal provision of public goods and
the optimal non-linear income tax.

































































> 0 8n (59)
Proof. Equation (53) can be rewritten by totally diﬀerentiating the utility function at du =
dG = 0, and substituting the result in the ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply to ﬁnd dc
dl
 
 u;  G =
 ul








uc = @ lnuc
@ lnl   @ lnuc
@ lnn . Substitution













@ lnl   @ lnuc
@ lnn

. The resulting equation is a linear diﬀerential equation in
, which can be integrated in a straightforward fashion to ﬁnd equation (56). Equation (55)
is found by totally diﬀerentiating utility at dl = du = 0 to ﬁnd dc
dG
 
 l; u =  
uG




















, and rearrange to ﬁnd equation
(57).
Equation (56) yields the solution of (n)=, which equals the marginal increase in social
welfare (in monetary units) of redistribution of one unit of income from households above n to
households below n. (n) = 0 everywhere if the government is not interested in redistribution.
Equation (57) gives the policy rule for the optimal provision of public goods. Deﬁne
(n) 
T 0(z(n))




















dF(n) = p: (61)
(n) indicates the extent to which public goods are overprovided relative to the ﬁrst-best Samuel-
son rule; cf. equation (45). Whether public goods are under- or overprovided compared to the
ﬁrst-best rule is determined by the presence of the distortionary income tax (T 0 (z(n)) > 0).
The more distortionary is income taxation, as indicated by a larger elasticity "(n), the more
public-goods provision deviates from the ﬁrst-best policy rule. (n) can be interpreted as an
implicit subsidy on public-goods provision at skill level n. (n) is diﬀerent from zero if the
marginal willingness to pay for the public good
uG(:)
uc(:) varies with labor supply or with ability. In
the absence of redistributional concerns, the marginal value of redistribution is nil ((n) = 0),
marginal tax rates are zero (T 0 (z (n)) = 0), and so is the implicit subsidy on public-goods pro-
vision ((n) = 0). In that case, public-goods provision satisﬁes the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule
(45).
The public good is more (less) complementary to work than consumption goods are, if the
marginal willingness to pay for the public good rises (falls) with labor eﬀort (i.e.,
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnl >
0 (< 0)).16 The provision of public goods then increases. The intuition is the same as in
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The government should provide more public goods if they are
more complementary to work than private goods are, and provide fewer public goods if they are
more complementary to leisure than private goods are. In doing so, the government alleviates the
distortions of the labor income tax on work eﬀort. To put it diﬀerently, if
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnl > 0 (< 0),
a higher (lower) level of public-goods provision relaxes the incentive constraints associated with
redistribution of income, as households with high ability are less tempted to mimic households
with a lower ability. The Atkinson and Stern (1974) term capturing the interaction of the public
goods with labor supply is therefore also present under non-linear taxation. See also Christiansen
(1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993).
16The term
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnl(n) can be rewritten as !l (lG   lc), where !l   lul
u > 0 is the utility share of labor, lG 
ulGu
( ul)uG is the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between public goods and labor, and lc  ulcu
( ul)uc
is the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between private goods and labor. Thus, the willingness to
pay for the public good increases with labor supply if lG > lc. That is, if public goods are stronger Hicksian
complements to labor than private goods are.
25When the utility function diﬀers across households, public-goods provision should also be
employed for redistribution. Public-goods provision can extract additional information on the
skill level, since the willingness to pay for the public good directly varies with skills. If the
marginal willingness to pay for the public good rises (falls) with ability (i.e.,
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnn > 0 (< 0)),
then the public good beneﬁts the households with higher skill levels relatively more (less).17
Consequently, the level of public-goods provision falls (increases) for redistributional reasons.
This is analogous to the presence of the G-term in the modiﬁed Samuelson rule obtained under
the linear case. If
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnn > 0 (< 0), then high-skill types are less (more) tempted to mimic
low-skill types if public-goods provision expands, since they have a stronger (weaker) preference
for public goods. Consequently, incentive-compatibility constraints are relaxed (tightened), and
public-goods provision reduces (increases) the distortions of redistributing income. If the utility
function is identical for all households n, this term drops out (i.e.,
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnn = 0). Intuitively,
diﬀerences in earning ability are then the only source of inequality. If the marginal willingness to
pay for the public good does not directly vary with ability, the government is unable to extract
more information on hidden ability by providing public goods – ceteris paribus. Therefore,
the public good is not under- or overprovided relative to the ﬁrst-best rule for redistributional
reasons. Indeed, the non-linear income tax is then a more eﬃcient instrument for redistributing
income than is public-goods provision. See also Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen
(1993).
This ﬁnding contrasts with the case of the linear income tax; optimal provision of the public
good is always found to be dependent on the distributional impact of the public good, except for
the (trivial) case in which the marginal willingness to pay is equal for all households. With linear
taxation, the government uses an informationally inferior instrument to redistribute income by
ignoring the information on individual earnings. Hence, the government optimally complements
the income tax by using indirect instruments for redistribution, such as public-goods provision.
The expression for the optimal non-linear income tax in equation (58) is identical to Mirrlees
(1971). "(n) > 0 is a measure for the compensated labor supply elasticity, see also equation (59).
At each point in the income distribution, the government trades oﬀ the distortions of a higher
marginal tax rate against the distributional gains of the marginal tax. If " is larger, the optimal
tax rate should be set lower. When households have identical preferences, "  @ lnl
@ ln((1 T0)n) is ob-
tained, which exactly equals the compensated labor supply elasticity. If households with a higher
ability have a lower willingness to pay for leisure, then
@ ln( ul=uc)
@ lnn < 0, and the compensated labor
supply elasticity falls as ability increases (and vice versa).
If the taxed labor base is larger, then nf(n) is higher, and the welfare losses of distortionary
taxes increase, because more households or households with higher skill levels are aﬀected by
higher marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rates should be higher if the marginal value of
redistribution
(n)
 increases. The marginal value of redistribution is zero at the bottom of the
17The term
@ ln(uG=uc)
@ lnn can be rewritten as !n (nG   nc), where !n  nun
u > 0 is the utility share of ability,
nG  unGu
unuG is the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between public goods and ability, and nc  uncu
unuc
is the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between private goods and ability. The willingness to pay for
the public good increases with ability if nG > nc. That is, if public goods are stronger Hicksian complements
to ability than private goods are.
26income distribution (in the absence of bunching at zero labor eﬀort). Hence, marginal tax rates
are zero. The intuition is that it is not optimal to distort labor supply for the lowest-skilled
household if there is no one below that household beneﬁtting from redistribution. If there is
bunching at zero labor supply, the marginal tax rate at the bottom is positive, since positive
marginal tax rates then help to redistribute income from households with positive labor supply
to households with zero income; see Seade (1977) and Ebert (1992). Similarly, if the skill
distribution is bounded, the marginal tax rate should be zero at the top. Intuitively, it makes
no sense to distort the labor supply of the highest-skilled household, since there will be no one
contributing to more redistribution (cf. Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977)). However, if the skill
distribution is unbounded, the top rate might not converge to zero; see also Diamond (1998) and
Saez (2001). The reader is referred to Mirrlees (1971), Seade (1977), Tuomala (1984), Diamond
(1998) and Saez (2001) for more elaborate discussions of the optimal non-linear tax.
Christiansen (1981), Boadway and Keen (1993) and Kaplow (1996) discuss the case in
which the utility function is identical for all households and is (weakly) separable between
(private/public) consumption and leisure. They ﬁnd that the optimal provision of public goods
then follows the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule. Naturally, the allocations will diﬀer between ﬁrst-
and second-best.
Proposition 8 If private utility is given by u(n)  u(h(c(n);G);l(n)), 8n, then the optimal







dF(n) = p: (62)




@ lnn = 0.
Substitution in (57) yields (62).
The reason for this result is that public goods do not help to reduce the tax wedge on labor
supply, because the marginal willingness to pay for the public good does not vary with labor
supply. Therefore, public-goods provision does not aﬀect the incentive-compatibility constraints.
Moreover, it does not help to improve income redistribution, since the marginal willingness to
pay for the public good does not vary with skills. As a result, it is not optimal to provide public
goods above or below levels that would be prescribed by the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule.
4.5 Marginal cost of public funds
The non-linear income tax does not deliver a direct measure for the marginal cost of funds. To
determine the marginal cost of funds, the welfare eﬀect is determined of a unit increase in the
intercept of the tax function,  T (0). Each tax payer is then provided with one unit of extra
income. This is equivalent to an increase in the lump-sum transfer by one unit of income under
the linear tax schedule. To determine the welfare eﬀect of this policy, a perturbation of  T (0)
along the optimal non-linear tax schedule is analyzed. This method is also employed by Saez
(2001) and Jacquet, Lehmann, and Van der Linden (2010).













Proof. Raising  T (0) by one unit has the following three eﬀects. Firstly, the government
loses one unit in resources per capita. Secondly, this policy mechanically raises social welfare –
measured in monetary equivalents – for each household by
	0(u(n))(n)
 . Thirdly, a larger  T (0)
generates behavioral changes on labor supply. Since marginal tax rates are unaﬀected by this
policy reform, substitution eﬀects are zero and only the income eﬀects matter. The income eﬀect
on labor supply changes tax revenues by T 0 (z(n))
@z(n)
@( T(0)) = T 0 (z(n))n
@l(n)
@( T(0)), 8n. The total












dF(n) = N: (64)
Rewriting yields the desired result.
At the optimum, the marginal cost of public funds for all tax instruments must be equalized.
Since  T (0) is equivalent to a non-distortionary non-individualized lump-sum tax, at the op-
timum the marginal cost of funds for all other tax rates must be equal to the marginal cost of
funds of  T (0). Thus, at each point in the income distribution, tax distortions should be equal
to distributional gains for all marginal tax rates.
To summarize, the analysis of optimal non-linear taxation and public-goods provision qualita-
tively conﬁrms the ﬁndings under optimal linear taxation. Tax distortions are not an ingredient
of the modiﬁed Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods. However, the modiﬁed
Samuelson rule indicates a role for second-best interactions of public goods with labor supply
and/or distributional eﬀects of public goods if the willingness to pay for public goods varies with
labor supply and/or ability.
4.6 Normalization tax system
First-order conditions (53), (54) and (55), jointly with the household budget constraints (48), and
the economy’s resource constraint (50), describe the complete second-best optimal allocation in
the economy. However, none of these conditions reveal anything about the particular mechanism
by which the optimal allocation should be implemented. It is easily established that a non-linear
consumption tax  (c(n)), where 0(c(n)) 
d(c(n))
dc(n) denotes the marginal consumption tax rate
at consumption level c(n), can also implement the same optimal allocation as the non-linear






nf(n) . The equations
for (n)= (56) and the modiﬁed Samuelson rule (57), remain the same. Therefore, results for
public-goods provision are insensitive to the normalization of the tax system.18
18Boadway and Keen (1993) show that there is a numéraire issue under non-linear taxation. Based on Tuomala
(1990), they show that when the government uses a non-linear commodity tax on consumption, rather than on
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Saying that the marginal cost of funds equals one is merely making a statement about the opti-
mality of the tax system; if the marginal cost of public funds is one, welfare cannot be increased
by reallocating resources between the public and private sector. This result should probably hold
more generally in any model analyzing optimal policies allowing for non-distortionary transfers
between the public and private sector. This section explores some potential criticisms that could
be raised on the result that the marginal cost of public funds is one at the optimal tax system.
5.1 Optimality of the tax system
This paper followed common practice in the second-best literature by assuming that the gov-
ernment is a benevolent social planner and that markets are Pareto-eﬃcient in the absence of
government intervention. One can ask whether the government sets taxes optimally and whether
markets are always Pareto-eﬃcient in the absence of government intervention.
Benevolent planners may fail to implement second-best optimal policies in the presence of
commitment problems; see, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980). More-
over, in the real world tax systems are not set by benevolent planners, but by politicians. Political
systems create various distortions; see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000). In addition,
there can be all kinds of legal constraints that rule out certain policy instruments. Government
failure could explain why taxes and public goods are not set at second-best optimal levels. One
may therefore be tempted to conclude that government failure raises the marginal cost of public
funds above one. However, this conclusion cannot be drawn in general if the underlying sources
of government failure are not explicitly speciﬁed. A well-functioning democracy, a just legal
system, the presence of countervailing powers, and the protection of citizens against abuses of
government power have social beneﬁts. Economic analysis should take into account both the
costs and beneﬁts of political and legal systems. It could then be conjectured that the marginal
cost of public funds is one if political and legal institutions are optimized; the marginal costs of
a given political or legal rule should be equal to its beneﬁts.
Not only governments, but also markets can fail. Asymmetric information, transaction costs,
monopoly/monopsony power, and externalities prevent an eﬃcient market outcome. Again, one
might be tempted to conclude that market failure pushes the marginal cost of public funds below
one, so that government intervention becomes more attractive. However, without explicitly
incorporating the fundamental reasons why markets fail into the analysis, it is unwarranted to
conclude that the marginal cost of funds lies below one if markets fail. Governments could be
confronted with the same fundamental problems that give rise to market failures. Furthermore,
from the theory of the second-best, it is well-known that the implications of market failure for
the determination of second-best policies are generally ambiguous as government intervention
could either exacerbate or reduce pre-existing market failures. For future research, the marginal
income, the preferences under which the standard ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule applies are diﬀerent than the weakly
separable structure of preferences as in un = u(h(cn;G);ln). This does not imply, however, that the modiﬁed
Samuelson rule under non-linear taxation needs to be modiﬁed for the marginal cost of funds.
29cost of funds should be derived by explicitly modeling market or government failure from ﬁrst
principles, not by introducing ad hoc constraints on the government instrument set.
5.2 Instrument set
Any measure for the marginal cost of public funds obtained from models with ad hoc constraints
on the instrument set of the government is bound to be misleading. This paper has demonstrated
that ruling out non-individualized lump-sum taxes – as a short-cut for an unspeciﬁed distribu-
tional problem – has large consequences for the marginal cost of funds. However, one can debate
whether, at the margin, governments have access to non-distortionary transfers, given practical
(or even legal) problems in implementing lump-sum taxes.
From a theoretical point of view, the lump-sum part of the tax system analyzed in the current
paper generally consists of subsidies (i.e., transfers) to households. In particular, the intercept
of the tax function is negative. Therefore, it is perfectly feasible to marginally reduce lump-
sum transfers to the private sector. Indeed, within the context of the model, there is nothing
preventing the government to implement a tax system with lower transfers. Moreover, also in
the real world, tax systems generally entail a general tax credit or tax exemption, which can be
(and often is) changed by policy makers, without running into practical or legal problems.
One could extend the model to allow for migration of households, resulting in participa-
tion constraints as in, for example, ?. This is a large deviation from the assumptions used
in the standard literature on the marginal cost of public funds. Nevertheless, even lump-sum
taxes/transfers are probably no longer neutral from an eﬃciency point of view. In particular, a
marginal reduction in the transfer induces some individuals to migrate. It could be conjectured
that the marginal cost of public funds is then no longer one at the optimal tax system. Future
research could explore the role of participation constraints for the marginal cost of public funds.
5.3 Kaplow and sub-optimal taxation
Kaplow (1996), Kaplow (2004) and Kaplow (2008) argue that even when the tax system is not
optimal, neither distributional concerns nor incentive eﬀects of the ﬁnancing of public goods with
distortionary taxes should be included in the discussion of second-best policy analysis. Laroque
(2005) and Gauthier and Laroque (2009) contain similar ideas and provide rigorous proofs of this
claim. The message of Kaplow is, loosely speaking, equivalent to saying that the marginal cost
of funds is always equal to one – even in suboptimal tax systems. However, in this argument,
the government simultaneously does two things: i) it changes the provision of the public good,
and ii) it applies a beneﬁt-absorbing change in the tax schedule that fully extracts households’
willingness to pay for the public good. Given that preferences are homogeneous and separable,
this tax change does not aﬀect labor supply incentives. Hence, the tax adjustment can perfectly
imitate a pure beneﬁt tax. Consequently, the traditional Samuelson rule can be used to judge
whether public-goods provision should increase or not. This paper’s results are more general
in the sense that they apply under non-separable and heterogeneous preferences and also apply
to optimal linear taxation. Moreover, a beneﬁt-absorbing tax change is not required, either,
30in order to demonstrate that the marginal cost of public funds should not be present in the
cost-beneﬁt rule for public-goods provision. However, the important requirement is that the tax
system is optimized. A marginal change in distortionary taxes then produces exactly oﬀsetting
distortions and distributional gains from taxation that cancel out in the modiﬁed Samuelson
rule.
5.4 Implications for other public policies
The results of this paper have larger relevance to other public policies than public-goods provi-
sion. Sandmo (1975), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and ? show that the tax distortions result
in a less aggressive corrective tax policy. Intuitively, corrective taxes exacerbate preexisting
distortions of the labor tax. However, these papers do not motivate tax distortions from redis-
tributional concerns. By explicitly incorporating optimal redistribution, Jacobs and de Mooij
(2010) demonstrate that the marginal cost of public funds is again equal to one. Thus, it is
generally incorrect to set optimal corrective taxes below Pigouvian levels, as in Sandmo (1975),
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and ?.
Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) show that under distortionary taxation Ricardian
equivalence breaks down, and debt-ﬁnancing and tax-ﬁnancing of public spending cease to be
equivalent. Since tax distortions are convex in the tax rates, it is better to smooth taxes over
time, rather than having time-varying tax rates. Therefore, the appropriate use of public debt
sustains tax smoothing. Werning (2007), however, demonstrates that ignoring distributional
concerns to motivate tax distortions has fundamental consequences for the theory of optimal
debt management. The reason is that, on the margin, the government always has access to
non-distortionary sources of ﬁnance (i.e., non-individualized lump-sum transfers). Thus, the
marginal cost of public funds is constant and equal to one over time. Debt and (lump-sum) tax
ﬁnancing are therefore equivalent and Ricardian equivalence is restored.
Finally, when the marginal cost of funds is equal to one, revenue-raising instruments (such
as taxes) are not superior to revenue-neutral instruments (such as regulation), or to revenue-
reducing instruments (such as subsidies). The reason is that the fundamental informational
constraint – ability is private information – cannot be relaxed by simply adopting a diﬀerent
policy instrument. Quantity controls, regulation or auctions can sustain a second-best optimal
allocation equally as well as price instruments. Hence, one needs to include additional constraints
into the analysis in order to assess the desirability of revenue-raising over revenue-neutral or
revenue-reducing policy instruments.
5.5 Applied cost-beneﬁt analysis
The analysis in this paper shows that one should not make corrections for tax-distortions in the
applied cost-beneﬁt analysis if one assumes that taxes are optimally set. Alternatively, if one
assumes that taxes are not optimally set, one should include not only the costs of taxation, but
also the (distributional) beneﬁts of taxation in the cost-beneﬁt analysis. The valuation of the
distributional beneﬁts of taxation is, however, a hazardous task for any policy analyst, since it
31inevitably involves a judgement about the desirability of redistribution of welfare. For practical
policy analysis it is probably best to invoke Becker (1983)’s eﬃcient redistribution hypothesis,
which argues that the political system should achieve an outcome in which all opportunities
for political gains to redistribute incomes are exhausted. In that case, the deadweight losses
should again be equal to the distributional gains of distortionary taxes, and no correction for
the deadweight losses of taxation should be applied in cost-beneﬁt studies.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the simultaneous setting of optimal taxes and the provision of public goods
in models with heterogeneous agents having heterogeneous preferences. Both optimal linear and
non-linear tax schedules are analyzed. It has been demonstrated that tax distortions are the
ultimate result of redistributional concerns. Using the appropriate deﬁnition for the social value
of private income, the marginal cost of funds at the optimal tax system is one under optimal
linear and non-linear taxes. Indeed, saying that the marginal cost of public funds equals one is
a making a mere statement of the optimality of the tax system; society cannot gain welfare by
reallocation of resources between the public and the private sector, since at the optimum these
resources are valued equally by the government and the private sector. Moreover, at the optimal
tax system, the marginal cost of public funds for all tax instruments should be equalized. Hence,
the marginal cost of funds for distortionary taxation equals the marginal cost of funds for non-
distortionary taxation. The distributional beneﬁts of distortionary tax rates should therefore be
equal to the marginal excess burden of tax rates.
The modiﬁed Samuelson rule should thus not be corrected for the marginal cost of funds
under linear and non-linear taxation. If the government was not interested in redistribution,
then all public goods would be ﬁnanced with non-distortionary lump-sum taxes. However,
there might well be corrections in the Samuelson rule for interactions of the public good with
labor supply and the distributional impact of the public good. With speciﬁc assumptions on
preferences, the ﬁrst-best Samuelson rule is applicable in the second-best, although second-
best allocations naturally diﬀer from ﬁrst-best allocations. In particular, with optimal linear
taxes, utility should be homogeneous across agents, quasi-linear in consumption, and completely
separable in its arguments. With non-linear income taxes, utility should be homogeneous and
feature weak separability between labor, on the one hand, and consumption of private and public
goods, on the other.
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